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Civil Procedure
By JOHN R. IEATHERS* AND MATTHEW L. MOONEY**
INTRODUCTION
Because the most recent issue of the Kentucky Law Survey
omitted coverage of civil procedure, this Survey covers cases
involving procedural issues for the two-year period prior to the
summer of 1985. This discussion includes cases from both the
Kentucky Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. Only those
cases designated "To Be Published" will be discussed.' Practi-
tioners are reminded that opinions denoted as "Not To Be
Published" cannot be cited in Kentucky as authority despite the
fact that slip opinions and the Kentucky Law Summary descrip-
tions of such cases are routinely available.2
The cases discussed were selected for various reasons. In
some areas the occurrence of several conceptually related cases
indicated the necessity of comment. In other instances, a single
case appeared worthy of comment standing alone. The authors
rejected many cases because the issues the cases presented were
not sufficiently unique or important to merit comment. With
the omission of such significant numbers of cases, obviously this
Survey is not intended to be a comprehensive guide to Ken-
tucky's civil procedure case law for the past two years. Practitioners
should make their own updates on prior cases using normal legal
research methods.
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. B.B.A., University
of Texas at El Paso; J.D., University of New Mexico; LL.M., Columbia University. Of
Counsel, McCoy, Baker & Newcomer, Lexington, Kentucky.
** J.D. Candidate, University of Kentucky, 1986.
"Every opinion shall show on its face whether it is 'To Be Published' or 'Not
To Be Published'." Ky. R. Civ. P. 76.28(4)(a) [hereinafter cited as CR]. For the full
text of the Rule, see KENTUcKy RuLEs OF COURT (West 1985).
2 "Opinions that are not to be published shall not be cited or used as authority
in any other case in any court of this state." CR 76.28(4)(c).
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Viewed as a group, both the selected and rejected cases
continue the tendency to rely heavily on federal trial and appel-
late decisions interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3
With the strong similarity between the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure, such
reliance is expected to continue. Federal decisions should remain
a good source of authority for the practitioner who is faced with
a Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure issue not previously reached
by the Kentucky courts. Additionally, federal commentators re-
main a fertile source of authority for Kentucky decisions, al-
though the preference for Wright and Miller's 4 well-known treatise
over Moore's5 similar treatise is not as marked as previously. 6
Finally, the practitioner is alerted, as a source of authority for
the interpretation of Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure, to the
new version of Clay's Kentucky Practice, recently published by
United States District Court Judge William Bertelsman and Kurt
Philipps. 7 This new version is an excellent update of the prior
work and contains more extensive citations and commentary
than its predecessor. With these factors, caveats and principles
in mind, the various Survey topics are addressed in roughly the
order encountered in most civil procedure treatises and case-
books.
I. LONG ARM JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction over nonresidents of Kentucky is controlled by
the Kentucky long arm statute. 8 In Texas American Bank v.
Sayers9 the Kentucky Court of Appeals continued its expansive
reading of the long arm statute, although the court still lacks a
comprehensive updating of its jurisdictional philosophy. 0
I See Leathers, Tomasi & Hunt, Civil Procedure, 70 Ky. L.J. 551, 552 (1981-82).
4 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
(1969-82).
J. MooRE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE (2d ed. 1948).
See Leathers, Tomasi & Hunt, supra note 3, at 552.
W. BERTELSAN & K. PHnupps, KENTUCKY PRACTICE (4th ed. 1984).
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 454.210 (Bobbs-Merrill 1985) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
674 S.W.2d 36 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1180 (1985).
10 See Leathers, Rethinking Jurisdiction and Notice in Kentucky, 71 Ky. L.J. 755
(1982-83).
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Mitchell, a Texas resident, purchased thirty-six percent of
the stock in the Owensboro National Bank." Mitchell also owned
stock in Central Bank & Trust of Owensboro and First Bank &
Trust of Mt. Vernon, Illinois. At Mitchell's request, Sayers
moved from Texas to Kentucky to become vice president and
chief executive officer of Owensboro National Bank. Subse-
quently, Mitchell induced Sayers to leave Owensboro National
Bank and serve in a similar capacity in the Mt. Vernon bank.
In 1975, Mitchell (in Texas) made an oral contract by telephone
with Sayers (in Kentucky). Under the terms of the contract
Sayers would receive one-half of Mitchell's profit from the sale
of the Mt. Vernon bank if Sayers procured a buyer.
12
Sayers secured a buyer but was denied his commission. He
filed suit in Kentucky, asserting jurisdiction over Mitchell under
the long arm statute section concerning transacting business.
3
The issue before the court of appeals was whether the telephone
transaction between the parties, viewed in light of Mitchell's
other contacts with the state, fell within the statute.
In upholding Kentucky jurisdiction, the court of appeals
noted that "[c]ourts have interpreted Kentucky's statute to ex-
tend to the outer limits of the due process clause." 1 4 While it is
doubtful 5 that a long arm statute limited to claims arising from
the particular contact is actually as broad as due process will
allow, the jurisdictional holding in Savers seems quite defensible.
By applying the three-pronged analysis used by the court of
appeals in Tube Turns Div. of Chemetron Corp. v. Patterson
Co.,16 the court concluded that Mitchell was subject to personal
jurisdiction in Kentucky. 7 First, as Tube Turns requires, Mitch-
ell "purposefully avail[ed] himself of the privilege of acting...
" 674 S.W.2d at 37.
12 Id.
13 KRS § 454.210(2)(a) (1985) provides: "'A court may exercise personal jurisdiction
over a person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim arising from the person's:
1. transacting any business in this Commonwealth."
4 674 S.W.2d at 38.
11 See Leathers, supra note 10, at 772.
16 562 S.W.2d 99, 100 (1978). The three criteria were originally delineated by the
Sixth Circuit in Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir.
1968).
1 674 S.W.2d at 38-39.
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or causing consequences" in Kentucky by owning and arranging
to sell Owensboro National Bank and Central Bank & Trust of
Owensboro. 18 Speaking with Sayers by telephone from Texas
while Sayers was in Kentucky seems to constitute purposeful
action in Kentucky; Mitchell's offer was heard and accepted in
Kentucky. Second, Sayers' claim against Mitchell arose from a
contract formed in Kentucky when Sayers by telephone accepted
Mitchell's offer to seek a buyer for the Mt. Vernon bank.' 9 The
final element of the three-pronged Tube Turns test is that the
nonresident defendant have substantial enough contact for the
exercise of jurisdiction to be reasonable. Using the analysis
approved by the Sixth Circuit in First National Bank of Louis-
ville v. J. W. Brewer Tire Co. ,20 the Sayers court found the third
element of reasonableness, noting that: "When the first two
elements [purposefully avail and arise from contact] are met, an
inference arises that the third, fairness, is also present; only the
unusual case will not meet this third criterion.' '21
The result in Sayers seems to be the only reasonable result
under the circumstances. While, regarding the particular contract in
question, the nonresident defendant did not physically set foot
in Kentucky, the defendait knew that he was dealing With a
Kentucky resident. Indeed, the offeree was in Kentucky con-
ducting the nonresident offeror's business. A failure to recognize
that a nonresident acting in Kentucky by telephone has a signif-
icant contact in Kentucky would be to ignore the realities of the
modern age of communications. Such a failure would not auger
well for the future, which will have increasing electronic contacts
rather than the direct physical contacts typical in the past. The
Kentucky long arm statute would be "short" rather than "long"
if it were interpreted differently.
,1 Id. at 39.
19 Id.
2 680 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir. 1982).
2, 674 S.W.2d at 39. It is interesting to note the reliance by a state court upon a
federal decision interpreting a state statute. While state courts understandably rely upon
federal interpretations of procedural rules that are almost identical to state rules, the
reliance upon federal decisional law aside from rules is harder to justify. There exists,
in interpreting the state statute, no analogy to a federal statute. Without such analogy,
reliance upon federal precedent in interpreting a state rule is justified only if the federal
authority is a particularly persuasive interpretation of exactly the same statute as is later
before the state court.
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In addition to mandating that the state have jurisdiction
before it can adjudicate, due process also requires that the
nonresident defendant be given constitutionally sufficient notice
of the action pending against him. The Kentucky Supreme Court's
recent decision in Haven Point Enterprises v. United Kentucky
Bank22 touched upon that notice requirement. Unfortunately in
Haven Point the Court continued to confuse the related issues
of jurisdiction and notice.
23
As seems to be typical of most significant notice cases, Haven
Point Enterprises involved an attempt by a nonresident defend-
ant to have a default judgment set aside. 24 Haven Point Enter-
prises was a Florida corporation, which had registered an agent
in Kentucky for service of process.2 Despite the existence of the
registered agent, the plaintiff (United Kentucky Bank) attempted
service of process through the Secretary of State as provided in
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) section 454.210(3). As statu-
torily required, the Secretary of State attempted service by cer-
tified mall. The Secretary's return stated that no return receipt
was received, nor was the notice itself returned by the United
States Postal Service. Haven Point Enterprises argued that, at
least in regard to a corporation with a registered agent, such
service was insufficient.
26
In rejecting Haven Point Enterprises' argument, the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court reasoned that the plaintiff had a choice!
he could either serve through the registered agent 27 or through
the Secretary of State. 28 Either was an acceptable method; neither
was preferred; and the conjunctive use of both was not re-
quired. 29 The Court noted: "Each confers personal jurisdic-
tion."3 0
2 690 S.W.2d 393 (Ky. 1985).
" See Leathers, Tomasi & Hunt, supra note 3, at 555.
690 S.W.2d at 394. In a case not involving a prior judgment, it is factually
difficult for a defendant to argue inadequate notice; if notice were faulty, how could
the defendant know to be present to defend upon those grounds? The defendant's
presence defeats the argument as a practical matter. Cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (argument advanced by guardian ad litem).
690 S.W.2d at 394.
6 Id.
" Service through a registered agent is authorized by KRS § 271A.565 (1981).
Z3 Service through the Secretary of State is authorized by KRS § 454.210(3).
2 690 S.W.2d at 395.
" Id.
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This is an unfortunate statement since it confuses jurisdiction
with notice. Service has nothing to do with jurisdiction over the
nonresident defendant. Though the facts are unclear, nothing in
the opinion suggests that Haven Point Enterprises was not sub-
ject to personal jurisdiction through Kentucky's long arm stat-
ute. Thus the confusion of jurisdiction and notice, which had
previously arisen in the case of Cox v. Rueff Lighting Co.,3
continues and seems to imply that jurisdiction depends upon
notice. Such is clearly not the case; even actual notice cannot
supply jurisdiction when the nonresident defendant's contacts
are insufficient. Notice is simply another requirement of due
process. Without both jurisdiction and notice, a constitutionally
defensible judgment cannot be rendered; but the two are quite
separate concepts.3 2
Aside from that semantic difficulty, the Court is on solid
ground in holding that a plaintiff may choose the method of
service of process. A holding preferring one method over the
other would obviate the alternatives that seem to have been
statutorily left open.3 3 A requirement that both methods be used
would be unduly burdensome and repetitious.
In upholding the sufficiency of service without a signed
return receipt from the nonresident defendant, the Kentucky
Supreme Court verified the court of appeals' position that such
a return was not constitutionally or statutorily required.3 4 Re-
garding a possible statutory requirement, the Kentucky Supreme
Court noted that the long arm statute allowed the Secretary of
State to attach to the return of service a signed registry receipt
"if any."3 5 From this, the Court concluded that the statute did
not require the presence of such a receipt for service to be
effective.36
In proceeding without the receipt, the Court is on extremely
firm constitutional ground. In the early days of service upon
nonresident motorists, the United States Supreme Court struck
3 589 S.W.2d 606 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
32 See notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text.
3 See KRS §§ 271A.565, 454.210(3).
u See 690 S.W.2d at 395.
31 Id. (citing KRS § 454.210(3)(b)).
36 690 S.W.2d at 395.
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down as unconstitutional a statute that did not on its face call
for the state official to send notice by mail to the nonresident
defendant.37 Later, in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust,38
the Court defined "constitutionally required notice" as notice
that is reasonably calculated to actually inform the defendant of
the pending action.39 Combining these two holdings, all that is
constitutionally required is that a state adopt a statute that on
its face sets into motion a notice scheme that is reasonably
calculated to inform nonresident defendants of pending actions.
Thus, the Kentucky notice provisions are valid because "the
statutory provisions in themselves indicate that there is reason-
able probability that if the statutes are complied with, the
defendant will receive actual notice. . . ."40 None of the cases
has ever suggested that actual notice is required. The effect of
such a holding would be a disaster, since it would promote
process dodging by nonresidents. Kentucky's statutory scheme
does not necessitate that resident plaintiffs prove actual notice
to nonresidents. Jurisdiction exists based upon minimum con-
tacts, and notice is provided by a sufficient statutory provision.
II. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
During this survey period, the court of appeals decided two
important cases in which the defendant plead that the action was
time barred.4' As in all pleas of bar by operation of a statute
of limitations, the crucial question in each was whether the
statutory time had already run at the time of the action. 42 In
one case, this question centered on when the cause of action
arose. 43 In the other, the question was whether the action had
"commenced" under the statute and under Kentucky Rule of
Civil Procedure 3 within the statutory time limit.44
" Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928). Service was struck down even though
service had been mailed and was received. The Court reasoned that a statute lacking
such notice provision was unconstitutional on its face. Id. at 24.
. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
Id. at 314.
• 276 U.S. at 24.
' Graham v. Harlin, Parker & Rudloff, 664 S.W.2d 945 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983);
Rose v. Ikramuddin, No. 83-CA-475-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 1983).
1 See 664 S.W.2d at 946; No. 83-CA-475-MR, slip op. at 5.
See 664 S.W.2d 945.
See No. 83-CA-475-MR, slip op. at 5.
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A. Accrual of a Cause of Action: Subjective or Objective
Standard
Generally, the statute of limitations begins to run against a
cause of action only after the plaintiff suffers an actionable
wrong.4 In malpractice actions against attorneys arising from
negligence or omissions, at least three points have been used to
start the statute of limitations running: the time of the negligent
act, 46 the time of the damage,47 and the time of the plaintiff's
discovery of the harm. 48 Prior to this survey period, this last
"' See Louisville Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 580 S.W.2d 497,
500 (Ky. 1979). See also 51 A.s. JuR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 107 (1970).
6 See, e.g., United Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v. Law Firm of Best, Sharp, Thomas &
Glass, 624 F.2d 145, 149 (10th Cir. 1980) (applying Oklahoma law); Robbins v. Mc-
Guiness, 423 A.2d 897, 898 (Conn. 1979); Peppers v. Siefferman, 304 S.E.2d 511, 512
(Ga. 1983); McArthur v. Baker, 7 Ky. Law Rep. 441, 441 (1885); Sullivan v. Stout, 199
A. 1, 4 (N.J. 1938); Banton v. Marks, 623 S.W.2d 113, 116 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1931);
Goodyear Metallic Rubber Shoe Co. v. Baker's Estate, 69 A. 160, 160 (Vt. 1903);
Cornell v. Edsen, 139 P. 602, 603 (Wash. 1914). The harshness of this rule is evident,
and perhaps explains why it is not adhered to as universally as it once was. See generally
New Developments in Legal Malpractice, 26 Am. U.L. Rav. 408, 439-40 (1977) (rhe
rule imposes upon the client the duty to recognize substandard professional conduct
when it happens, either requiring him to be as expert in the law as his attorney, or hire
another attorney, and encourages an attorney to violate his or her fiduciary duty by not
disclosing his or her own negligence if discovered.); Annot., 32 A.L.R.4th 260, at § 5
(1984 & Supp. 1985); Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 978, at § 4 (1968 & Supp. 1984).
41 See, e.g., Pioneer National Title Ins. Co. v. Andrews, 652 F.2d 439, 442 (5th
Cir. 1981) (applying Florida law); Bonanno v. Potthoff, 527 F. Supp. 561, 564 (N.D.
Ill. 1981) (applying Illinois law); Kellermeyer v. Miller, 427 So. 2d 343, 345 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983); Shideler v. Dwyer, 386 N.E.2d 1211, 1215 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); Webb
v. Pomeroy, 655 P.2d 465, 468 (Kan. 1982); Price v. Holmes, 422 P.2d 976, 980 (Kan.
1967). Of course, there must be an injury if there is to be a cause of action in a
malpractice case. This rule should not be confused with the requirement that there be
an injury for a cause of action to arise. See Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Osborne,
573 F. Supp. 1045, 1048-49 (E.D. Ky. 1983) (applying Kentucky law); Mitchell v.
Transamerica Ins. Co., 551 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
1 The "Discovery Rule" holds that an action for malpratice accrues and the
statute of limitations begins to run when the attorney's negligent act is discovered or
should have been discovered by the plaintiff. See, e.g., Yazzie v. Olney, Levy, Kaplan
& Tenner, 593 F.2d 100, 103 (9th Cir. 1979) (applying Arizona law); Neel v. Magana,
Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 491 P.2d 421, 433 (Cal. 1971); Johnson v. Haugland,
303 N.W.2d 533, 539 (N.D. 1981); Skidmore & Hall v. Rottman, 450 N.E.2d 684, 685
(Ohio 1983) (overruling all prior inconsistent cases); Melgard v. Hanna, 607 P.2d 795,
796 (Or. Ct. App. 1980); Mills v. Killian, 254 S.E.2d 556, 558 (S.C. 1979). The discovery
rule is made a part of the statute of limitations in KRS § 413.245 (Bobbs-Merrill Cum.
Supp. 1984), construed in Graham v. Harlin, Parker & Rudloff, 664 S.W.2d 945 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1983).
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method, the so-called "discovery rule," had been applied in
Kentucky to medical malpractice 9 and products liability actionss0
to determine when the applicable statute began to run. The court
of appeals' decision in Graham v. Harlin, Parker & Rudloff,"'
however, was the first application, in Kentucky, of this doctrine
to a legal malpractice action.5 2
The complaint in Graham arose out of a divorce decree,
entered in 1974, which provided for payment to Mrs. Frances
Graham of "$500.00 per month toward the support of the
family." '5 3 In August, 1980, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
categorized these payments as "alimony," "taxable to Mrs.
Graham ... and assessed a deficiency against her personal
income tax returns for ... $17,260.56." 54 In October, 1980,
Mrs. Graham petitioned the United States Tax Court for a
reevaluation of the deficiency. The Tax Court was unmoved.
Despite a nunc pro tunc order of the Warren Circuit Court
declaring that the payments were for the support of the children,
the tax court entered an order in August, 1982, assessing the
deficiency against Mrs. Graham. 5
More than a year after the receipt of the deficiency notice,
in September, 1981, Mrs. Graham filed a malpractice action
against her attorney in the original divorce proceeding for "fail-
ing to advise her of the tax consequences of the wording of the
original divorce decree and ... [for] failing to correct that
wording to avoid taxation of the payments .... -56 The defend-
ant moved to dismiss the action on the basis of KRS section
413.245. This statute directs that a malpractice action must be
- See Hackworth v. Hart, 474 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Ky. 1971); Tomlinson v. Siehl,
459 S.W.2d 166, 167 (Ky. 1970).
- See 580 S.W.2d at 501.
" 664 S.W.2d 945 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
52 Early on, Kentucky adhered to the rule that in an action for attorney malprac-
tice, the statute of limitations runs from the time of the negligence. See 7 Ky. Law Rep.
440. Note, however, that this decision was based upon a contractual theory, and was
phrased in terms of a cause accruing from the contract's breach. Such a characterization
is rendered moot in jurisdictions such as Kentucky that have enacted separate statutes
of limitations applicable to legal malpractice.
.1 664 S.W.2d at 946.
Id.
" Id.
! Id.
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brought "within one (1) year from the date of the occurrence
or from the date when the cause of action was or reasonably
should have been discovered by the party injured.
'57
As the Graham court noted, the statute embodies the dis-
covery rule "approved in Louisville Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville
Products." s In that case, the Kentucky Supreme Court refuted
the contention that the discovery rule was an exception59 that
applied only to medical malpractice cases, and approved the
application of the discovery rule to a products liability action.60
Although the holding in Louisville Trust Co. did not concern
the discovery rule's application to a professional malpractice
action, KRS section 413.245, enacted in 1980, is a codification
of the ruling of that case and by its terms is generally applicable
to all malpractice actions.
6 '
The problem in Graham centered upon the meaning of the
phrase "from the date when the cause of action was or reason-
ably should have been discovered." ' 62 Two related points of
interpretation of this phrase were tackled in Graham: 1) how is
it determined when the plaintiff discovers the required facts,
63
and 2) what must the plaintiff discover?6
First, it is unclear exactly what standard should be used to
establish when the plaintiff discovered the facts necessary to
start the statute running. A fair reading of the statute's "knew
or should have known" clause would imply that an objective
standard should be used for determining a plaintiff's knowledge
of his or her cause of action. Arguably however, neither the
statute nor the decision of Louisville Trust Co. "approving" the
- KRS § 413.245.
1 664 S.W.2d at 947 (citing 580 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1979)).
19 580 S.W.2d at 500.
0 Id. at 501.
61 See KRS § 413.245. Following a trend to import the discovery rule from medical
malpractice cases to legal malpractice cases, the Kentucky legislature passed the present
professional malpractice statute. See Johnston, Attorney Accountability in Kentucky-
Liability to Clients and Third Parties, 70 Ky. L.J. 747, 784-87 (1981-82). This general
malpractice statute is clearly applicable to legal malpractice actions through a sister
statute that defines "professional services" to include the practice of law. See IRS §
413.243 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
KRS § 413.245 (quoted in 664 S.W.2d at 947).
63 See text accompanying notes 65-66 infra.
64 See text accompanying notes 67-72 infra.
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use of the discovery rule necessarily establishes this.65 The question
raised in Graham was whether under Louisville Trust Co., as
codified in the statute of limitations, a plaintiff has to be sub-
jectively or objectively aware of his or her cause of action before
the statutory time begins to run.66
Second, Louisville Trust Co. and KRS section 413.245 differ
in what the plaintiff must know to start the statute running.
Under KRS section 413.245, the injured party must discover a
"cause of action; ' 67 while under the ruling of Louisville Trust
Co. the plaintiff must discover that "he has been injured ...
[and] also that his injury may have been caused by the defend-
ant's conduct. ' 6 The question raised in Graham on this point
was whether the injured party must know that she had a legal
"cause of action" within the technical definition of that word,
or whether a mere understanding that she had been harmed
would suffice to start the statute running.
69
The court of appeals, citing the ruling of Louisville Trust
Co., dispensed with both points addressed above, holding that
"[tihe knowledge that one has been wronged and by whom starts
the running of the statute of limitations for professional mal-
practice, not the knowledge that the wrong is actionable. ' 70 The
court found it evident from Mrs. Graham's testimony that she
had actual knowledge that a wrong had been committed against
her and by whom in November, 1980, when the IRS assessed a
tax deficiency against her resulting from the wording of the
divorce decree. 7' Basing its decision at least partly upon testi-
mony as to her subjective knowledge, the court declined to toll
the statute of limitations and concluded that the statute of
limitations began to run in November, 1980.72
1' In Louisville Trust Co., the Court said: "A cause of action will not accrue
under the discovery rule until the plaintiff discovers or in the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have discovered not only that he has been injured but also that his
injury may have been caused by the defendant's conduct." 580 S.W.2d at 501 (quoting
Raymond v. Eli Lilly and Co., 371 A.2d 170, 174 (N.H. 1977)).
See 664 S.W.2d at 947.
KRS § 413.245.
580 S.W.2d at 501.
See 664 S.W.2d at 947.
Id. (citing Conway v. Huff, 644 S.W.2d 333, 334 (Ky. 1982)).
664 S.W.2d at 947.
' Id.
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It should, however, be noted that there is an objective di-
mension to the court's test. With the statute having been acti-
vated by an objective piece of evidence (the deficiency notice),
the court concluded that a reasonable person under those cir-
cumstances should have known that they had been wronged.
73
Thus, Mrs. Graham's subjective state of mind coincided with
what the objective evidence said her state of mind should have
been-her testimony indicated that when she received the defi-
ciency she knew something was wrong. 74 It is that knowledge,
both objectively and subjectively demonstrable, that sets the
statute in motion. Whether, in a subsequent case, the court will
require the presence of both elements, or whether the presence
of one or the other will be sufficient, remains to be seen.
The Graham court obviously did not want to hold the
plaintiff to a standard of knowledge that an attorney would be
judged by as to the meaning of "cause of action." The court,
however, did wish to give full effect to the statute of limitations.
Consequently, the court rejected Mrs. Graham's suggestion that
she did not have the required knowledge under the statute to
start the statute of limitation running, since she did not know
that she had a "cause of action." ' 7- In rejecting this argument,
the court essentially ruled that a layman's understanding of a
"cause of action" would suffice to begin the statute of limita-
tions running.
76
The Graham ruling, while perhaps reaching the correct result,
has an undesirable consequence to whatever extent it may be
read as relying upon the plaintiff's subjective knowledge to set
the statute in motion. Specifically, the court in Graham has
apparently endorsed, in part, a subjective standard for the
knowledge required under the malpractice statute of limitations.
This is a virtual Pandora's box. The subjective approach presents
obvious problems with proof; perjury and protracted proceed-
ings to determine when the statute begins to run are undesirable
possibilities. In the future the court should emphasize Graham's
objective dimension. A review of the objective evidence and
1 Id. at 946-47.
7" See id. at 946.
71 Id. at 947.
76 See id.
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measurement against what a reasonable person should have
known under those facts is an exercise well-understood by the
judiciary. In a case where the evidence demonstrates that the
subjective state of mind was what a reasonable person should
have known, the case is simple. In case of a divergence, however,
the time factor should be governed by the objective standard.
While this may foreclose a cause of action for a person who
subjectively had no knowledge, rationality dictates a common
standard against which all claims can be measured. The goal of
statutes of limitations-uniformity-should not be lost sight of
in formulating a test for the running of the statute.
To the practitioner, Graham's lesson is clear: cover all bases.
If there is a possibility that the statutory time on an action is
running: file. In a case such as Graham where issues germane
to the action are already being litigated elsewhere, institute the
second action anyway, and ask the court to stay the action
pending the outcome of the prior litigation.
B. Commencement of an Action
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 directs that "[a] civil
action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court. '"77
Federal Rule 3 does not directly address the gap between the
time that the action is "commenced" by filing and the time that
the notice is given to the opposing party by service of process
u.ider Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.78 In other words, it is
possible for an action to "commence" under Federal Rule 3,
yet for the opposing party not to be served with notice until
much later. The statute of limitations problem in this situation
is simply that some statutes define commencing an action oth-
erwise than as defined in Federal Rule 3.79 In such a case, the
question becomes whether the statute was tolled when the action
was procedurally "commenced by filing," or was tolled when
the action "commenced" at some later point in time as defined
by the statute itself (e.g., when notice of filing is actually re-
cei, ed by the defendant). Federal Rule 4(a)0 was supposedly
" FED. R. Civ. P. 3 [hereinafter cited as FRCP].
79 See FRCP 3 & 4.
71 See, e.g., KRS § 413.250 (1972).
'- FRCP 4(a).
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promulgated to "minimize [this] problem' ' s8 by requiring the
clerk to "forthwith issue a summons" and deliver it for service
to the marshal or to any other person authorized by Federal
Rule 4(c) to serve it upon filing of an action.82
In Kentucky, the "forthwith" issuance of a summons re-
quired in Federal Rule 4 was evidently not enough of a minimi-
zation. Kentucky, unlike some close sister states, 3 adds to Federal
Rule 3 an extra requirement of "good faith.'"' Kentucky Rule
of Civil Procedure 3 reads: "A civil action is commenced by the
filing of a complaint with the court and the issuance of a
summons or warning order thereon in good faith."8 5 The good
faith provision in Kentucky Rule 3 is different from the text of
Federal Rule 3, but is in line with some authorities' interpretation
of Federal Rule 3 as requiring an intent on the part of the
plaintiff that the procedures outlined in Federal Rules 3 and 4
will be carried out diligently.
86
Thus temporal requirements alone do not determine when
an action commences under Kentucky Rule 3. "Good faith,"
9, See 2 J. MOORE & J. LucAs, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE q 3.07[l] (2d ed.
1985) [hereinafter cited as 2 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE].
2 See FRCP 4(a), (c).
"See, e.g., OHIO R. Civ. P. 3; W. VA. R. CIv. P. 3.
CR 3.
Id. (emphasis added).
See Shelley v. Bayou Metals, 422 F. Supp. 545, 546 (W.D. La. 1976) (Fill,
suit is contingent upon "reasonably timely service on the defendants or their proper'.
agents."). Some federal courts, however, have held under the Federal Rules of Civi.
Procedure that a federal cause of action is commenced in federal court simply by filing.
See, e.g., Howard v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 742 F.2d 612, 613 (11th Cir. 1984) (suit
under § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982)); Moore
Co. v. Sid Richardson Carbon & Gasoline Co., 347 F.2d 921, 922 (8th Cir. 1965). See
also 2 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 81, q 3.07[4.-3-2], at 3-117-18; 4 C.
WRtI-IT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1056, at 178-81 (1969 &
Supp. 1985).
Regardless of the case law debate, in 1983, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(a)
was amended to require that the plaintiff have the intent to comply with the rules with
due diligence. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(a) reads:
Upon the filing of the complaint the clerk shall forthwith issue a
summons and deliver the summons to the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attor-
ney, who shall be responsible for prompt service of the summons and a
copy of the complaint. Upon request of the plaintiff separate or additional
summons shall issue against any defendants.
FRCP 4(a) (emphasis indicates 1983 amendments) cited in 2 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTIC",
supra note 81, 4.01[32], at 4-40.
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too, is required. 7 In Rose v. Ikramuddin,88 the Kentucky Court
of Appeals faced the issues of exactly what constitutes "good
faith" and whether this "requirement" demands something more,
or allows something less, than the strict temporal requirements
of Kentucky Rule 3 to "commence" an action.
In Rose, a complaint naming Dr. Kamar J. Ikramuddin in
a medical negligence action was filed on March 14, 1980, "three
days before the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations
provided for by KRS section 413.410."1 9 On that same day, the
Johnson Circuit Court Clerk issued summonses for the three
defendants, including Dr. Kamar J. Ikramuddin. The original,
and a copy of the summons for Dr. Ikramuddin, were sent by
the circuit court clerk to the Sheriff of Floyd County where Dr.
Ikramuddin lived and practiced. 90 The Floyd County Sheriff
neither served the summons nor returned it to the Johnson
Circuit Clerk to be filed in the record. 91 Nothing more was done
in the case by either Dr. Ikramuddin or the plaintiff for over
one year. 92
On April 28, 1981, the plaintiff's counsel discovered for the
first time that Dr. Ikramuddin had not been served by the Floyd
County Sheriff. The plaintiff then caused another summons to
be issued for Dr. Ikramuddin, which was served on May 15,
1981. Two weeks later on May 29, Dr. Ikramuddin filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint against her on the grounds that
it was barred by the statute of limitations. The Johnson Circuit
Court at first overruled the motion, but upon a later motion by
Dr. Ikramuddin, reversed its earlier ruling and dismissed the
case. The plaintiff appealed this ruling claiming that she had
complied with both KRS section 413.250, the applicable statute
of limitations, and Kentucky Rule 3 by causing a summons to
be issued in good faith.
93
The applicable statute of limitations in Rose read: "An
action shall be deemed to commence on the date of the first
See CR 3.
No. 83-CA-475-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 1983).
Id., slip op. at 3.
Id., slip op. at 3-4.
Id., slip op. at 4. See also CR 4.01(l)(b).
No. 83-CA-475-MR, slip op. at 4.
See id., slip op. at 5-8.
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summons or process issued in good faith from the court having
jurisdiction of the cause of action. ' 94 This statute's good faith
requirement is the same as that required by Kentucky Rule 3.
Thus, the court had only to decide whether the plaintiff's good
faith, as required by both the statute and the rule, was destroyed
by the failure to determine that Ikramuddin had not been served
within the period between the issuance of the two summonses.95
If the plaintiff's good faith was destroyed, then neither the
requirements of KRS section 413.250 nor Kentucky Rule 3 could
be met, and the action was not timely under either the rule or
the statute.
96
The court found that while
It]he lapse of fourteen months ... exhibits a regrettable
lack of diligence on the part of plaintiff's attorney.... [Sluch
lack of diligence does not destroy the good faith that was
exhibited when the attorney delivered his check to the clerk,
who caused the summons to be issued and put in the mail...
in accordance with the procedures established by the Kentucky
Rules of Civil Procedure.
97
The court expressly found that this case was unlike Brock v.
Turner Fuel Co.,98 in which the good faith of the plaintiff was
destroyed by complete and willful delay, 99 and was like Rucker's
Adm'r v. Roadway Express, Inc.,10° in which the mere attempt
by an attorney to ascertain an address for service was sufficient
to show good faith and toll the statute of limitations.' 0 '
At least three facets of the Rose decision are of note pro-
cedurally. First, good faith, as it appears in both Kentucky Rule
3 and KRS section 413.250 does not mean a subjective measure
of the attorney's intent to secure service. Second, good faith, at
least under this statute of limitations, is established by objective
means; specifically by reference to and compliance with the
KRS § 413.250.
See No. 83-CA-475-MR, slip op. at 5.
See id., slip op. at 5-6.
9, No. 83-CA-475-MR, slip op. at 7 (emphasis added).
178 S.W.2d 427 (Ky. 1944).
No. 83-CA-475-MR, slip op. at 6-7.
131 S.W.2d 840 (Ky. 1939).
10, See No. 83-CA-475-MR, slip op. at 6-7.
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procedures tontained in Kentucky Rules 3 and 4. Third, an
attorney need exercise only the barest diligence in prosecuting
the case to establish good faith and so "commence" an action
and toll the statute of limitations. The Rose court clearly estab-
lishes the good faith clause in the statute and in the rules as a
presumption in favor of the plaintiff who can show compliance
with the mechanical requirements of the Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Accordingly, even sizable delays by the plaintiff's attorney
must be shown by the defendant to have been "willful" in order
to show bad faith. 0 2
The policy rationale for the Rose court's ruling is evident.
The court is reluctant to punish or reward the parties for their
attorneys' ineptitude or delay. The plaintiff in Rose was un-
questionably injured and had a clear cause of action against the
defendants. Ikramuddin, although not served personally, prob-
ably had actual notice of the suit and, regardless, was not
prejudiced by the delay since "very little had been done in the
prosecution of the case following the issuance of the first sum-
mons."103 Interpreting the good faith clause against the plaintiff
would have punished the plaintiff for the attorney's sins.
III. CLASS ACTIONS
Despite the existence of a Kentucky class action rule that is
identical to the federal rule, I 4 Kentucky case law concerning
class actions is relatively rare. This is probably because the
practicing bar perceives the federal courts as a more appropriate
setting for class action litigation than state courts. Yet, given
what might be perceived as a restrictive attitude in the federal
system toward class actions, 05 practitioners should consider the
,,,' See 178 S.W.2d at 429 (A willful delay "has been uniformly held by this court
as destructive of 'good faith' in the issuing of process necessary for the 'commencement'
of an action so as to toll limitation statutes."). Accord Garrison v. International Paper
Co., 714 F.2d 757, 760 (8th Cir. 1983) ("The most important factor in the balance is
the egregiousness of the plaintiff's conduct.").
" No. 83-CA-475-MR, slip op. at 8.
FRCP 23; CR 23.01-.05.
'" See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Zahn v. International
Paper Co. 414 U.S. 291 (1973); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
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use of state courts.'0 During the survey period, two cases were
decided in Kentucky touching upon issues relevant to class ac-
tions in the state court system. 10 7
As previously noted in regard to long arm jurisdiction, due
process requires that parties be given adequate notice of a pend-
ing action. 10 8 In a class action case, adequate notice is compli-
cated because the case may be either a plaintiff class action or
a defendant class action.'09 The requirement of some sort of
notice to bind members of a defendant class seems plain enough
without extended commentary. The ability of a properly desig-
nated class action to bind the interest of an absent, represented
party (i.e., member of the plaintiff class) is well-settled as a
matter of constitutional law." 0 Also, basic fairness would seem
to dictate that a represented party be given some sort of notice
of a pending action that may bind him. Despite the logic of that
conclusion, the Kentucky Court of Appeals recently decided that,
at least as to one type of class action, notice to represented
parties is not required."'
In Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't v. Hayse,"2 a
library patron attempted to compel the Lexington-Fayette Urban
County Government to fund the Lexington Public Library in
accordance with the statutory mandate of KRS section
173.360(l)." 3 The relief sought was prospective in nature only;
no effort was made to secure unappropriated past funding. Nor
were damages requested either for the class or for the repre-
sentative party. As is frequently true in class actions seeking
only declaratory or injunctive relief, there was absolutely no
legal necessity for using the class action vehicle." 4 Had the
patron prevailed individually on the merits of the claim, the
11 See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. 2965 (1985) (decision
arose from class action originating in state court system of Kansas).
107 Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't v. Hayse, 684 S.W.2d 301 (Ky. Ct. App.
1984); Bellarmine College v. Hornung, 662 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
,-' See text accompanying notes 22-40 supra.
,09 See FRCP 23; CR 23.01.
105 S. Ct. at 2975; Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940).
684 S.W.2d at 303.
M 684 S.W.2d 301 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
M1 Id. at 302. KRS § 173.360(1) (Bobbs-Merrill 1980) provides that "the legislative
body shall appropriate money annually to furnish such [library] service."
"1 See 684 S.W.2d at 303.
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Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government would have had
to comply with the court's mandate just as though that mandate
had run in favor of thousands of persons. Nevertheless, the
action was brought as a class suit, probably because of the
publicity and political pressure that inure to such actions. As
the court of appeals noted, it was not "necessary to maintain
this action as a class action, but it [was] allowable.""' 5
The plaintiff class prevailed on the merits in Fayette Circuit
Court. On appeal the issue was raised whether the members of
the plaintiff class (presumably all users of the Lexington Public
Library) should have been notified of the pending action. In
holding that no notice to the class members was required," 6 the
court of appeals also obviated the necessity of ruling upon what
form that notice should have taken.
The issue of notice to represented parties in a plaintiff class
action is one that has proven to be quite thorny in the federal
court system. Following a convoluted procedural history stretch-
ing over almost a decade, the United States Supreme Court ruled
in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin' 7 that notice by mail was re-
quired to all members of the class"8 and that the cost of that
notice had to be borne by the representative parties." '9 Those
familiar with the holding in Eisen may feel that the court of
appeals decision in Hayse is clearly wrong. A closer examination,
however, reveals that the two cases are distinguishable and that
the Hayse decision serves to clarify one of the points left unset-
tled in Eisen.
The class action in Hayse was not an ordinary consumer
class action; it was an action solely for declaratory or injunctive
relief.' 20 Thus the Hayse action was certified under Kentucky
Rule of Civil Procedure 23.02(b).' 2' In contrast, Eisen was a
' Id.
i Id.
417 U.S. 156 (1974).
"I Id. at 173-77.
"I Id. at 177-79.
See 684 S.W.2d at 302-03.
1-" Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 23.02 provides:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of Rule
23.01 are satisfied, and in addition: ... (b) the party opposing the class
has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class,
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normal consumer class action involving common questions of
law or fact and seeking monetary damages; it was certified under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). 22 Normal consumer
class actions under Federal Rule 23(b)(3) or its Kentucky coun-
terpart, Kentucky Rule 23.02(c), are subject to special notice
requirements. The notice provisions applicable only to these
types of class actions instruct the court certifying the action to
direct the giving of notice to represented parties so that they can
elect whether to "opt-out" of the action, to appear and partic-
ipate, or to rely upon the representative parties.'2
Although it was clear after Eisen that the United States
Supreme Court required an attempt at actual notice to all rep-
resented parties,' 24 it was not clear immediately thereafter why
the Court reached its conclusion. The reason for the confusion
is that portions of the Eisen decision indicated that such notice
thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declar-
atory relief with respect to the class as a whole ...
'M Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) provides:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of
subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition ... (b) the court finds that
the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predom-
inate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy.
2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2) provides:
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall
direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be
identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member
that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a
specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all
members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does
not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his
counsel.
Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 23.03(2) provides:
In any class action maintained under Rule 23.02(c), the court shall direct
to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circum-
stances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (a)
the court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified
date; (b) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members
who do not request exclusion; and (c) any member who does not request
exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
,24 See 417 U.S. at 173-77.
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arose from the specific notice provisions of Federal Rule
23(b)(3).'z If that were the basis for the notice holding in Eisen,
then the notice standard would be inapplicable to actions brought
under Federal Rules 23(b)(1) or (2); its holding would be limited
to the actions brought under Federal Rule 23(b)(3). Yet, in
addition to its discussion of the rule requirements of notice, the
Eisen Court also intimated that the notice standard upheld therein
was constitutionally required under due process as explained in
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.l2 6 Obviously, if
the source of the notice requirement in Eisen was constitutional
rather than statutory, then the notice requirements would be
applicable to all types of class actions, not just those maintained
under Federal Rule 23(b)(3).
After Eisen, courts were in disarray in determining whether
Eisen's notice standards had any application outside Federal
Rule 23(b)(3) class actions.'27 The leading commentary in the
area criticized any attempt to apply Eisen outside Federal Rule
23(b)(3) actions, noting that such application was "directly con-
trary to the language of Rule 23, itself, . . . [falling] to take
account of the reasons justifying the different treatment .... 1, 8
Actions under Federal Rule 23(b)(3) necessitated a higher notice
standard since such classes were "only loosely associated" in
relationship to legal or factual issues rather than being united
by "any pre-existing or continuing legal relationship," as would
be the case for groups assembled under Federal Rules 23(b)(1)
and 23(b)(2).' 2 9 This position, holding that the notice standard
in Eisen was a product of the rules applicable to Federal Rule
23(b)(3) class actions, has now emerged as a clear-cut majority
position.,30
See id.
'" 339 U.S. 306, 314-15, 318 (1950), cited in 417 U.S. at 174-75.
,2, See text accompanying notes 128-131 infra.
,Z, 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1786, at
142-43 (1972).
Id. at 143.
" See Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997, 1022-23 (5th Cir. 1979); Ives v. W.T.
Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749, 764 (2d Cir. 1975); Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508
F.2d 239, 254-57 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975); Society for Individual
Rights, Inc. v. Hampton, 528 F.2d 905, 906 (9th Cir. 1975); Ryan v. Shea, 525 F.2d
268, 275 (10th Cir. 1975).
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In Hayse the Kentucky Court of Appeals simply held: "No-
tice to members of the class is not required in an action under
CR 23.02(b)." 13' In so doing, the court was limiting the opt-out
notice requirements to class actions brought under the Kentucky
counterpart of Federal Rule 23(b)(3). Thus the Kentucky holding
is not violative of due process and keeps the construction of the
Kentucky rule in line with the construction being put upon the
federal rule.
3 2
Class action notice issues pale, however, in comparison with
the issue of the appealability of class action certification deci-
sions. Current class action rules require that the trial court decide
whether the case is to proceed as a class action; the mere fact
that the plaintiff or plaintiffs have so designated the action is
not dispositive of that issue.' 3
Certifying an action as a class action obviously has a great
effect upon the subsequent litigation. With a class estimated to
be in excess of six million persons, in addition to the availability
of treble damages under federal laws relating to price fixing, 134
the Eisen defendants' potential monetary exposure was virtually
incalculable. Thus a decision to certify the action as a class
action would have virtually coerced the defendants into settling.
The leverage granted to the plaintiffs in such a situation is
obvious. By the same token, a decision not to certify in such a
case has far-reaching consequences for the representative party.
Despite the crucial nature of class certification decisions,
however, the final judgment rule has presented a serious obstacle
to appellate review. In most jurisdictions, appellate review of
trial court actions is limited to reviewing final judgments. 35
Previously, some federal courts attempted to overcome that ob-
stacle and reviewed certification decisions. 36 Such review was
justified on the grounds that practically, if not legally, a certi-
684 S.W.2d at 303.
2 See note 130 supra and accompanying text.
"4 See FRCP 23(c)(1); CR 23.03(1).
"4 417 U.S. at 160, 166. The petitioner's own personal damages were only $70.00.
Id. at 161.
135 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1966).
" For a detailed discussion of the five methods developed to appeal an interlocu-
tory denial of class certification, see C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 128, § 1802,
at 271-84.
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fication decision was tantamount to a final judgment on the
merits of the case. 3 7 The rationale was that a decision not to
certify served as the "death knell" of the plaintiff's ability to
pursue the action since it would not be pursued individually.'38
The "reverse death-knell doctrine" held that a decision to certify
exposed the defendants to such risk that they would then settle
on the merits favorably to the class. 3 9 Both lines of reasoning
allowed appellate review of what otherwise was not a final
judgment.
At the current time, such class certification decisions are no
longer reviewable in the federal system. At least regarding a
decision not to certify a class, the United States Supreme Court,
in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,'14 rejected the death-knell
doctrine as a vehicle for review. Although not yet ruled upon
by the United States Supreme Court, there is no reason to
suspect that the reverse death-knell doctrine will fare any better.
In Bellarmine College v. Hornung,14 the Kentucky Court of
Appeals followed Coopers & Lybrand, 42 and determined that
certification decisions are not reviewable in Kentucky until the
entry of a final judgment. 43 Noting that there was no Kentucky
authority on the point, the court felt that "an analogy may be
clearly drawn from federal cases addressing the issue."' 44 The
court held that a trial court decision certifying the action as a
class action (thus really involving the reverse death-knell doc-
trine) was not appealable despite an attempt by the parties and
the trial court to make the decision sound like a normal multi-
" Id. at 271-77.
"' Id. at 271-72. See Korn v. Franchard Corp., 443 F.2d 1301, 1306 (2d Cir. 1971);
Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 295 n.6 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977
(1969).
'I See Blackie v. Barrach, 524 F.2d 891, 896 (9th Cir. 1975). Blackie characterizes
the "reverse death knell" doctrine as causing "irreparable harm to the defendant in
terms of time and money spent in defending a huge class action." Id. citing Herbst v.
International Telephone and Telegraph Corp., 495 F.2d 1308, 1312 (2d Cir. 1974).
-- 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
"4 662 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
"4 437 U.S. at 477.
662 S.W.2d at 848-49.
Id. at 848.
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party or multi-claim order under Kentucky Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 54.02. 1
4
The results in Coopers & Lybrand and Hornung appear to
contradict Eisen,146 but, in Hornung, the court of appeals rec-
onciled the apparent conflict. Although the United States Su-
preme Court did review Eisen before a final judgment, that
review was not concerned with the certification itself. Rather,
the issues before the Court were the form of the notice to be
given and who would bear the cost of that notice. 47 Review was
granted under the exception to the final judgment rule that has
become known as the "collateral order" doctrine. 4 The notice
issue was considered only tangentially related to the merits of
the action and subsequent review would have been meaningless;
either insufficient notice would have been given or the wrong
party would have borne the expense of notice. Thus no mean-
ingful review of the issue would have been available after reach-
ing a decision on the merits.' 49 There has been no indication that
certification decisions fall within that category of collateral or-
ders.
With the limited availability of class actions in the federal
system due to subject matter jurisdiction and amount in contro-
versy problems, the state courts seem a natural place to conduct
class action litigation. Eisen and Hornung are well-reasoned and
place Kentucky squarely in the mainstream of decisional law
involving such actions. Future developments in the area are
expected as the joinder device becomes more widely used in the
state courts.
IV. REMOVING THE CASE FROM THE JURY
During the survey period, the court of appeals had two
occasions to address a trial court's power to control an issue's
submission to the jury. In one case, the question at issue con-
141 Id. at 849. Kentucky Rule 54.02 allows appeals in cases involving multiple claims
or multiple parties.
1, 417 U.S. 156.
'11 Id. at 172-79.
"- The doctrine seems to have had its primary origin in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
149 417 U.S. at 172-79.
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cerned the trial court's power under Kentucky Rule of Civil
Procedure 39 to deny a trial by jury merely because the case is
complex.150 In the other, the question concerned what standard
the court should use in removing a case from the jury when
directing a verdict.1
5'
A. Right to a Trial by Jury
The seventh amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees the right to a jury trial in federal "Suits at common
law."'1 2 This provision is echoed in the Kentucky Constitution,'53
and is given procedural effect under Kentucky Rule of Civil
Procedure 38.01.5 4 The guarantee of a jury trial in both federal
and Kentucky constitutions has been held to preserve the fun-
damental right to a jury trial as it existed historically. 55 Histor-
"' White v. Sullivan, 667 S.W.2d 385 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
"' Grant v. Wrona, 662 S.W.2d 227 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
U.S. CONST. amend. VII:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law.
For a discussion of what is meant by "common law," see Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S.
433, 447 (1830).
- See KY. CONST. § 7:
The ancient mode of trial by jury shall be held sacred, and the right
thereof remain inviolate, subject to such modifications as may be author-
ized by this Constitution.
1"4 See Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 38.01, which reads:
The right of trial by jury as declared by the Constitution of Kentucky
or as given by a statute of Kentucky shall be preserved to the parties
inviolate.
-, See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430
U.S. 442, 459 (1977); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937).
Thus neither constitution creates a fundamental right to a jury trial where the right sued
upon is granted by statute. See, e.g., Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 379
(1974) (seventh amendment applies to recovery of possession of real property even though
brought under statute since historically there was right in such cases); Simmons v. United
States, 29 F. Supp. 285, 286-87 (W.D. Ky. 1939) (recovery under the Taft Act, 28
U.S.C. § 41, is not within the guarantee of the seventh amendment); Kentucky Comm'n
on Human Rights v. Fraser, 625 S.W.2d 852, 854 (Ky. 1981) (no right to jury trial
under KRS § 344.040 (1983) empowering the Commission on Human Rights to award
compensatory damages for embarrassment and humiliation caused by unlawful discrimi-
nation); Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Commonwealth, 179 S.W. 1080, 1082 (Ky. 1915)
(no right to jury trial under Kentucky tax statutes).
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ically, the right to a jury trial was a legal right, as opposed to
an equitable right. 15 6 Thus, originally, the seventh amendment s7
guarantee applied only to civil cases at law.'1s The merger of
law and equity in the United States left the scope of such
guarantees unclear. Because the federal and Kentucky courts
have taken divergent paths on the right to a jury trial, it is
useful to compare the two.
Beginning in 1959, with Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 59 the
United States Supreme Court began expanding the scope of the
traditionally legal right to a jury trial to include actions that
were historically equitable. In Beacon Theaters, the Court ruled
that equitable jurisdiction must be determined in light of the
legal remedies and procedures available after the merger of law
and equity under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure1 60 The
Court, recognizing the more liberal procedures under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, held that when an issue is common to
both legal and equitable claims in the same proceedings, the
legal issues must be tried to a jury first.' 6' Three years later, the
United States Supreme Court held in Dairy Queen, Inc. v.
Wood 62 that the right to jury trial exists for any issue that is
an element of a claim cognizable at law, even if that legal claim
is inconsequential compared to the equitable claim.' 63
Although the rulings of Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen
affirmed the right to a jury trial on issues common to legal and
136 See Carter v. Flegle, 232 S.W. 621, 622 (Ky. 1921) (In a purely equitable action
"a party is not entitled as a matter of right to have an issue of fact tried by a jury[;J
.. such right is within the sound discretion of the chancellor... ... "); 179 S.W. at 1082
("The constitutional right of a jury trial exists only in cases where, by the common law,
a jury trial was customarily had and the constitutional right to a trial by jury means a
trial according to the course of the common law.").
"I The term "seventh amendment" as used herein will encompass section seven of
the Kentucky constitution as well as the seventh amendment to the United States
Constitution since both constitutional guarantees have been given similar effect and
meaning. See cases cited supra note 155.
See 179 S.W. at 1082.
, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
, See id. at 509.
16 See id. at 509-11. See also 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTCE AND
PROCEDURE § 2302 (1971) ("[Ihe order of trial must be so arranged that issues common
to both the legal and equitable claim are tried to a jury before the court passes on any
purely equitable issues.").
," 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
163 See id. at 473.
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equitable claims, their applicability to actions that were histori-
cally purely equitable was uncertain. Both Beacon Theatres and
Dairy Queen involved claims that might have been tried at law,'
64
although the issues in Dairy Queen were predominantly equitable
in their origin. 65 In Ross v. Bernhard,66 the United States Su-
preme Court completed the expansion of the constitutional right
to a jury trial by extending that right to a historically equitable
action that could not have been brought at law. Ross established
the right to a jury trial in a shareholder derivative action, a
traditionally equitable cause of action. 67 The Court stated that
"the 'legal' nature of an issue is determined by considering,
first, the pre-merger custom with reference to such questions;
second, the remedy sought; and, third, the practical abilities and
limitations of juries."
68
Although the Ross decision actually expanded the right to a
jury trial, 69 some federal district courts have argued that a jury
trial should be denied if the litigation is so complex that it is
beyond the average jury's limitations. 70 This argument has two
premises. First, proponents maintain that, historically, courts of
equity tried a case before a judge partly because such cases were
too complicated for the average jury. 7' Ross is cited for the
supportive proposition that the determination of the legal or
equitable nature of an issue historically involves consideration
of the jury's abilities. 72 Second, proponents claim that some
" See id. at 479; 359 U.S. at 504.
" See 369 U.S. at 475-79.
" 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
,' See generally Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on Its Derivation,
32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 980, 986, 994 (1957) (Although a corporation could be sued "at law
or equity" in the earliest cases, the derivative suit developed as a "recognition of the
equitable right of the shareholder to call his trustees to account.").
"1' See 396 U.S. at 538 n.10. There is no authority cited for this footnote in the
decision and the Court apparently did not use these criteria in rendering its decision in
Ross.
Id. at 542-43.
See Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In
re Boise Cascade Securities Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99, 104 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
MJ See, e.g., Campbell & LePoidevin, Complex Cases and Jury Trials: A Reply to
Professor Arnold, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 965 (1980). Contra Arnold, A Historical Inquiry
into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 829
(1980).
" See, e.g., Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litigation, 92 HARv.
L. REV. 898 (1978-79).
1985-86]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 74
cases are so complex that a jury trial would amount to denying
constitutional due process because the jury could never under-
stand or weigh the issues. 1 3 Thus, proponents conclude that
both historically and practically a jury trial is improper in com-
plex cases. This conclusion has not been universally accepted,
however, and the status of the "complexity exception" to the
seventh amendment is uncertain in the federal courts. 74 It has
not been incorporated into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and the federal courts do not agree about its application. 75
In Kentucky the rule is that especially complex cases are tried
by a judge rather than by a jury. 76 Unlike the federal courts,
Kentucky courts have expanded the complexity rule without
conflicting with the Kentucky Constitution. 77 Indeed, the "ex-
- See, e.g., In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069,
1084-86 (3d Cir. 1980); Note, supra note 172, at 910-11.
17 See conflicting cases cited infra note 175. See generally Note, Presening the
Right to Jury Trial in Complex Civil Cases, 32 STAN. L. REv. 99 (1979-80); Note, Ross
v. Bernhard: The Uncertain Future of the Seventh Amendment, 81 YALE L.J. 112 (1971-
72); Comment, From Beacon Theatres to Dairy Queen to Ross: The Seventh Amendment,
the Federal Rules and a Receding Law-Equity Dichotomy, 48 J. URBAN LAW 459, 516
(1971). c ,
"I The Ninth Circuit has rejected these arguments, finding that there is no com-
plexity exception to the seventh amendment. See In re United States Financial Sec.
Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 424 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980). The Third
Circuit agrees, but in a very important case has stated that there may be some instances
in which a case is so complex that the use of a jury would violate fifth amendment due
process rights. See 631 F.2d at 1080.
,71 The Kentucky complexity rule grew out of equity's historical jurisdiction over
suits for an equitable accounting, especially in complex business cases. See, e.g., Com-
mercial Union Assur. Co. v. Howard, 76 S.W.2d 246, 247 (Ky. 1934) ("[Elquity has
concurrent jurisdiction in matters of accounts where they are of such a complex nature
as to render the remedy at law inadequate, and this jurisdiction should be exercised
where there is a serious doubt as to the true state of accounts or where there is difficulty
in adjusting them or where the questions involved are so numerous and complicated as
to render a jury trial impractical.").
Through the years, the Kentucky rule expanded to encompass all types of complex
cases. See Manchester Ins. & Indemnity Co. v. Grundy, 531 S.W.2d 493, 500 (Ky. 1975)
(jury is not equipped to evaluate the probable chances of recovery in a suit against an
insurer for bad faith in not settling a claim against its insured); City of Shively v. Hyde,
438 S.W.2d 512, 515 (Ky. 1969) (trial court properly determined that a suit by sewer
contractors against a city for amounts due that was consolidated with an action by the
supervising engineers against the city was impracticable for a jury to intelligently try);
McGuire v. Hammond, 405 S.W.2d 191, 193-94 (Ky. 1966) (jury trial properly denied
by trial court on basis of complexity of taxpayer's suit against school board).
"I See cases cited supra note 176.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
ception" in Kentucky has literally become the rule in the form
of language incorporated into Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure
39.01.178 It is the effect of this language that the Kentucky Court
of Appeals considered in White v. Sullivan.
179
White arose out of a contract action to enforce a covenant
not to compete. 10 In November, 1974, William J. Clancy, an
accountant, executed an employment contract containing a cov-
enant not to compete. The covenant provided that upon termi-
nating employment, Clancy would not practice public accounting
within fifty miles of the Fayette County border for five years
and would not represent anyone who was a client of the em-
ployer at the date of the termination. 8"
A year later Clancy terminated his employment and imme-
diately opened an accounting office in Lexington. One month
later, Clancy hired White as a Certified Public Accountant for
the office. At the end of that same month Clancy's former
employer filed suit against him and obtained a restraining order
requiring Clancy to obey the restrictions of the covenant not to
compete. Clancy and White moved to Somerset and continued
as before, resulting in Clancy's suffering a contempt order and
judgment against him for violating the restraining order.
8 2
After the contempt judgment, White moved to Lebanon,
Kentucky, but continued in the same relationship with Clancy
as before, which included serving the clients that Clancy had
brought with him from his former employer. In December, 1976,
January, 1979, and July, 1979, the court issued three separate
show cause orders "directing White to show cause why he should
not be held in contempt for aiding and abetting Clancy in
violating the injunction."'' 83 The court eventually found that
" Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 39.01 prescribes:
When trial by jury has been demanded as provided in Rule 38, the action
shall be designated upon the docket as a jury action. The trial of all issues
so demanded shall be by a jury, unless ... (c) the court upon motion or
of its own initiative finds that because of the peculiar questions involved,
or because the action involves complicated accounts, or a great detail of
facts, it is impracticable for a jury intelligently to try the case.
667 S.W.2d 385 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
See id. at 386.
in, See id.
,' See id. at 386-87.
Id. at 387.
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White had in fact schemed with Clancy in violating the restrain-
ing order, and ordered White to pay compensatory damages and
attorney's fees.
On appeal White contended that he was entitled to a trial
by jury on the issue of the fine for contempt. The court of
appeals followed the prevailing law in Kentucky, citing Rule
39.01(c), and held:
Here it is obvious that due to the complicated nature of the
case, the volumes of facts involved and the difficulty in ascer-
taining exactly what had transpired between the various ac-
countants and clients it was fully within the trial court's
discretion to refuse to designate this case as one for the jury.'14
On this basis the court approved the trial court's decision de-
nying a jury trial and holding White liable for over sixty-five
thousand dollars in compensatory damages.'8 5 The unusual as-
pect of the court of appeal's decision was not the approval of
refusing a jury trial, but the court's refusal to consider the
contempt judgment's size in deciding whether a jury trial was
appropriate. ,
86
In 1972 the Kentucky Court of Appeals, in Miller v. Vetti-
ner,5 7 addressed the issue of whether a defendant in a contempt
proceeding was entitled to a jury trial. The court concluded that
the trial court may determine matters of fact itself, but if the
penalty to be imposed is a fine greater than five hundred dollars
or incarceration longer than six months, then the offender must
be found guilty by the "unanimous verdict of a jury."' 5s
' Id. at 387-88.
See id. at 387, 389. Note that the appellate court reversed the trial court's award
of ovei thirteen thousand dollars in attorney's fees. Id. at 389.
Im See id. at 388. The court dismissed Miller v. Vettiner, 481 S.W.2d 32 (Ky. 1972),
and International Ass'n of Firefighters v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 555
S.W.2d 258 (Ky. 1977), as inapplicable to the present case since neither was as "factually
complex" as White. For a discussion of Miller and International Ass'n of Fireighters,
see notes 187-92 infra and accompanying text.
481 S.W.2d 32 (Ky. 1972).
' See id. at 35. The court stated:
[W]hen the existence or nonexistence of a contempt, civil or criminal,
requires the resolution of a factual issue the trial court may itself resolve
that issue ... but may not in such a case inflict a fine greater than $500
and incarceration for more than six months except upon the unanimous
[Vol. 74
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The Miller criterion for determining when a jury trial is
required in a contempt proceeding was later expressly overturned
in International Ass'n of Firefighters v. Lexington-Fayette Urban
County Gov't.189 In International Ass'n of Firefighters, the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court held:
Prospectively ... in a disputed factual situation the limitation
of a $500 fine without imprisonment as set out in Miller, is
no longer applicable. The determining factor will be whether
the fine is "petty" or "serious" and that will be determined
within the context of the risk and possible deprivation faced
by a particular contemnor.' 90
Applying this new standard, the Court affirmed the assessment
of a ten thousand dollar contempt fine by the trial court without
a jury, holding that the fine was "petty" as applied to the
Firefighters Union. 191
It is curious that the court of appeals in White makes such
short work of the ruling in International Ass'n of Firefighters
considering its relevance to the claim in White. The White court
passes off the ruling of International Ass'n of Firefighters with
barely' a word, noting the case only for the fact that the Court
therein approved the levy of a contempt fine without a trial by
jury, and finding it "unnecessary to apply this standard here
since we have found that the trial court acted correctly in denying
a jury trial due to the discretion the court is given in C.R.
39.01(c)."' 192
verdict of a jury finding the offender guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. The issue in Miller concerned a $500 fine for contempt and not the imposition of
compensatory damages as in White. White can be distinguished from Miller because the
penalties imposed in White were not punitive in nature. Note, however, that Miller is
not distinguishable simply because it approved a contempt fine without a jury as the
White court intimates. See 667 S.W.2d at 388 n.1. The contempt fine was affirmed
without a jury in Miller because it was only $500, although the Miller court stated that
such would not always be the case in contempt proceedings.
0-9 555 S.W.2d 258 (Ky. 1977).
"', Id. at 260 (relying upon the rationale expressed in Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S.
454 (1975)). Cf. cases cited in Annot., 26 L. Ed. 2d 916, 920-25 (1971) (deciding the
applicability of the sixth amendment right to a jury trial in cases of criminal contempt).
555 S.W.2d at 260.
,,z 667 S.W.2d at 388. It is unclear whether the court of appeals thought that the
standard in International Ass'n of Firefighters was inapplicable to the factual situtation,
or that the discretion granted the trial court under Kentucky Rule 39 simply overrode
that decision.
1985-86]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 74
Some conclusions from White are evident. First, in Ken-
tucky, the complexity rule apparently applies even to cases in
which other factors might ordinarily give rise to a jury trial.
Second, the historical characterization of an issue as legal or
equitable is not the basis for the application of Kentucky Rule
39.01(c), 93 despite such factors being relevant to the federal test
under Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen. 94 Finally, and most
importantly, the determining factor in the application of Rule
39.01(c) is the trial court's discretion. In short, under White, a
complex case is one which the judge says is complex.' g9
"I' Actions for injunctive relief are equitable in nature, and were unknown at
common law, therefore there is no constitutional right to a jury trial on a claim for
injunctive relief. See, e.g., United States v. State of Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 706 (1950).
It follows that there is no right to a trial by jury in a contempt proceeding to punish a
contemnor's violation of an injunction. See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364,
370-71 (1966) ("The conditional nature of the imprisonment-based entirely upon the
contemnor's continued defiance-justifies holding civil contempt proceedings absent the
safeguards of indictment and jury ... provided that the usual due process requirements
are met."); Eilenbecker v. Dist. Court of Plymouth County, 134 U.S. 31, 36 (1890) ("If
it has ever been understood that proceedings according to the common law for ontempt
of court have been subject to the right of trial by jury, we have been unable to find
any instance of it."). See generally Annot., 45 L. Ed.2d 815, 830-31 (1975) (United
States Supreme Court's views as to right to trial by jury in civil contempt proceeding);
9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2308 (1971) (no
constitutional right to jury trial for injunction claim). The standards pronounced in
Miller, Internat'l Ass'n of Firefighters and White demonstrate no consideration of the
fact that contempt proceedings are historically equitable in nature.
'9' See notes 159-63 supra and accompanying text.
,9 See text accompanying note 192 supra. This is not the case under the federal
complexity exception. In In re Japanese Electronic Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d
1069, the Third Circuit addressed the dual concerns of the "complexity" standard and
the trial court's apparent unfettered discretion to deny a trial by jury under this standard.
The court stated that "[t]he complexity of a suit must be so great that it renders the
suit beyond the ability of a jury to decide by rational means with a reasonable under-
standing of the evidence and applicable legal rules." Id. at 1088. The court then
enumerated three factors that would identify a case as complex: 1) the size of the suit
as measured by the length of the trial, the amount of evidence, and the number of
issues; 2) the conceptual difficulties in the case as evidenced by the difficulty of the legal
issues, the volume of factual evidence, the potential amount of expert testimony to be
submitted, and the potential length and detail of jury instructions; and 3) the difficulty
of segregating distinct aspects of the case as evidenced by the number of separate issues
in dispute that are related to single transactions or items of proof. See id. at 1088-89.
As to the trial court's unfettered discretion, the Japanese Electronic Prods. Antitrust
Litig. court believed that the good faith of trial judges and the limitations of due process
would keep the right to a jury trial intact despite judges' discretion to apply the
1985-861 CIVIL PROCEDURE
The most troublesome of these conclusions for the Kentucky
practitioner is that White offers no standard of complexity to
determine the use of Rule 39.01(c). True, White involved several
parties, a chain of complicated transactions, and lengthy litiga-
tion. The question is whether the facts of White were really so
complex that it was "impracticable for a jury intelligently to try
the case.' '196 If a case is to be deemed complex on these facts,
then perhaps medical and legal malpractice cases, as well as
products liability cases, class actions, and practically all multi-
party cases should fall within the same rubric. Such actions are
often quite complex and cover a variety of complicated trans-
actions that the average juror will have trouble "intelligently"
understanding. In such cases the practicing attorney should be
aware of the preclusive effect of Rule 39 and be prepared to
argue for a jury.
197
complexity exception. See id.
Although there are no Kentucky rulings on the nature of the complexity required
to support a Rule 39 denial of a trial by jury, the trial court's discretion is not totally
unfettered. See Whitfield v. Cornelius, 554 S.W.2d 870, 871 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (The
denial of defendant's demand for a jury trial in an action to recover on a promissory
note and counterclaim for money wrongfully taken was reversible error; the mere
assertion that it is " 'impractical for a jury intelligently to try the case' is not suffi-
cient."). Still, Kentucky lacks even general complexity guidelines such as those enum-
erated in Japanese Electronic Prods. Antitrust Litig.; White was no help.
1" CR 39.01(c). See note 195 supra.
117 When faced with a Rule 39 motion, a practitioner could argue for a jury trial
based on the systematic policy toward expanding rather than restricting the right to a
jury trial. This argument is supported by the substance and policy expressed in the
seventh amendment to the United States Constitution, section seven of the Kentucky
Constitution, the Federal and Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure, the Ross decision in
the federal courts, and the International Ass'n of Firefighters decision in the Kentucky
courts.
First, the seventh amendment to the United States Constitution and section seven
of the Kentucky Constitution were enacted to preserve the right to a jury trial. Rule 39
cannot as a matter of constitutional or procedural law, by operation of decision,
circumvent a constitutional right and the policy that underlies that right merely on the
basis of a judge's discretionary determination of practicality.
Second, Rule 38 plainly guarantees the right to a jury trial:
The right of trial [by] jury as declared by the Constitution of Kentucky or
as given by a statute of Kentucky shall be preserved to the parties inviolate.
CR 38.01. Furthermore, it is evident from the language granting the United States
Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules of procedure that Congress intended to
preserve the right to trial by jury. The statute provides:
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and
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B. Directed Verdict
Prior to Brady v. Southern Ry.,195 the federal courts had not
clearly chosen between the preponderance of evidence and the
reasonable man standards for directed verdicts. In Brady, how-
ever, the United States Supreme Court established the standard
as follows:
When the evidence is such that without weighing the credibility
of the witnesses there can be but one reasonable conclusion as
to the verdict, the court should determine the proceeding by
non-suit, directed verdict or otherwise in accordance with the
applicable practice without submission to the jury, or by judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict. By such direction of the trial
the result is saved from the mischance of speculation over
legally unfounded clams.19
While federal courts since Brady have used different formula-
tions of the Brady standard, they have generally been consistent
in mimicking the language of that case, and holding that a
directed verdict is proper when, "without weighing the credibility
of the witnesses, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as
to the verdict.
' '2
00
shall preserve the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared
by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution.
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982). The Kentucky Rules also embody this policy to the extent that
they are derived from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Third, the trend in the law is toward expansion rather than restriction of the right
to a trial by jury. In the federal arena this is seen in decisions such as Dairy Queen,
369 U.S. at 472-73, and Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. at 538. In Kentucky, this trend is
most obvious in International Ass'n of Firefighters, 555 S.W.2d at 258, which expanded
the right to a jury trial by adopting the dynamic "petty"/"serious" test.
- 320 U.S. 476 (1943).
9 Id. at 479-80.
-_ Id. See, e.g., United States v. Vahlco Corp., 720 F.2d 885, 889 (5th Cir. 1983);
Shakey's Inc. v. Covalt, 704 F.2d 426, 430 (9th Cir. 1983); Crowder v. Lash, 687 F.2d
996, 1002 (7th Cir. 1982); Kaye v. Pawnee Constr. Co., 680 F.2d 1360, 1364 (11th Cir.
1982); Strong v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 667 F.2d 682, 686 (8th Cir. 1981).
Where there is sufficient conflicting evidence so that reasonable men could reach
different conclusions, a directed verdict is improper. See Dace v. ACF Indus., 722 F.2d
374, 375 (8th Cir. 1983); Martin v. Unit Rig & Equip. Co., 715 F.2d 1434, 1438 (10th
Cir. 1983); Abshire v. Seacoast Prod., Inc., 668 F.2d 832, 835 (5th Cir. 1982); Onufer
v. Seven Springs Farms, 636 F.2d 46, 48 (3d Cir. 1980); Fortner Enter. v. United States
Steel Corp., 452 F.2d 1095, 1097 (6th Cir. 1971).
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The question left unanswered by Brady and its progeny is
how much evidence must be in conflict to deny a motion for a
directed verdict. 20 1 The only quantitative consensus seems to be
universal agreement that there must be something more than a
"scintilla" of evidence in question. Thus federal courts have
generally rejected the so-called "scintilla rule," which holds that
a court may not direct a verdict so long as there is any evidence
to support the proposition tendered by the party opposing the
motion .2 0
2
Although Kentucky initially followed the "scintilla rule,
' 20 3
it rejected that rule in 1940 in Nugent v. Nugent's Executor,
2
0
4
and adopted a standard similar to that used in the federal
courts. 201 Under Nugent, the trial court is granted the discretion
to direct a verdict in cases where there is only a scintilla of
evidence in issue. The Kentucky Court of Appeals applied this
standard during the survey period when it reviewed a directed
verdict in Grant v. Wrona.
2 6
In Grant, the plaintiff entered into a contract on June 20,
1981, for the purchase of the defendant's lot and house for
$40,500. Just over three months later, the plaintiff began an
"I The United States Supreme Court held that there must be a "sufficient" amount
of evidence in conflict before a motion for directed verdict will be denied. See Galloway v.
United States, 319 U.S. 372, 386-87 (1943). Lower federal courts often use the term "substantial
evidence" to show the amount of evidence that must be in conflict to create a jury question.
See Browne v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 698 F.2d 370, 371 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 930 (1983); 680 F.2d at 1364; Rheaume v. Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety, 666 F.2d 925,
929 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1106 (1982); Tackett v. Kidder, 616 F.2d 1050,
1053 (8th Cir. 1980). "Substantial evidence" has been held to denote "evidence of such
quality and weight that fair-minded jurors in the exercise of impartial judgment might
reach a different conclusion." Moore v. Johnson, 568 F.2d 1184, 1185 (5th Cir. 1978).
',2 See 680 F.2d at 1364; Steuber Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 646 F.2d 1093, 1095 (5th
Cir. 1981); 568 F.2d at 1185; Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Videfreeze Corp., 540 F.2d
1171, 1179 n.6 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977); Magnet Corp. v. B
& B Electroplating Co., 358 F.2d 794, 797 (Ist Cir. 1966); Lovas v. General Motors
Corp., 212 F.2d 805, 807 (6th Cir. 1954).
"' The scintilla rule was first adopted by Kentucky in Thompson v. Thompson, 56
Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 22, 29 (1856).
-- 135 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1940).
01' See id. at 883. See also W. BERTELsM sa & K. Prmipps, supra note 7, § 50.01,
at 185-87 (directed verdict proper where "the plaintiff produces no more than a scintilla
of evidence in his favor").
'- 662 S.W.2d 227 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
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action to rescind the contract premised upon allegations that the
defendants fraudulently concealed structural defects. 20 7 The case
was tried before a jury, and after the plaintiff's case, the defend-
ant moved for, and was granted, a directed verdict under Ken-
tucky Rule of Civil Procedure 50.201 In reviewing the trial court's
granting of the motion, the court of appeals stated:
The only question to be determined by the court on a motion
for directed verdict is whether the plaintiff has sustained the
burden of proof by "more than a scintilla of evidence," that
is, has the plaintiff submitted "evidence of probative value
having fitness to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable
men." 209
The court applied this standard and found that under Kentucky
law, although the evidence was circumstantial, a jury might infer
from it that the defendants knew about the defects in the house
when they sold it.21° On this basis the court of appeals found
that the plaintiff had presented evidence sufficient for a jury
determination and reversed the trial court's granting of the di-
rected verdict.
21 1
From Grant, it is evident that Kentucky courts are reluctant
to exercise the power granted under Rule 50 to cut off a party's
cause of action. Thus, in Kentucky, only unfounded claims will
be subject to a directed verdict, and consequently, the barest
conflicting evidence, even circumstantial evidence, will serve to
stave off a directed verdict.212
'01 See id. at 228.
2 See id.
1o See id. at 229 (quoting James v. England, 349 S.W.2d 359, 361 (Ky. 1961), and
citing Louisville & N.R.R. v. Chambers, 178 S.W. 1041 (Ky. 1915)).
210 See 662 S.W.2d at 229-30.
2.1 See id. at 229.
212 Contrast this reluctance with the court's ready denial of a jury trial under Rule
39 in White v. Sullivan, 667 S.W.2d 385.
While both Rules 50 and 39 are control measures available to the judge, they have
different foundations. The power to direct a verdict is grounded on the premise that
some cases are so obvious on their face that the law requires a particular result. See 9
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 193, § 2521, at 537. The power to deny a jury
trial for complexity is grounded on the opposite premise that some situations are so
convoluted that no ordinary jury could understand the facts so as to apply the law to
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V. APPELLATE PRACTICE
Kentucky appellate practice continues to be an area fraught
with dangers for the practitioner. In part, the dangers stem from
the Kentucky Supreme Court's previous decision in Foremost
Insurance Co. v. Shepard213 to require "strict compliance" with
the various rules relating to appellate practice. 21 4 What Justice
Leibson has called the "Draconian logic" of" 'strict compliance
with rules of procedure regarding appeals' announced in Fore-
most has led us to a point where appellate practice has become
a procedural nightmare for the litigant. ' 21 - Conversations with
various attorneys from across the state seem to confirm that the
practicing bar is more than simply nervous about the pitfalls of
appellate practice; apprehensive would be more accurate. Five
recent cases, 216 in addition to the class action appeal in Hayse, 217
illustrate these traps for the unwary appellate practitioner.
It has long been an axiom that appeals must be made within
the time limits set by the law. 25 To put the matter another way,
time begins to run on appeal rights whenever an appealable
decision is rendered. 2 9 Because of the practical difficulties in-
herent in identifying what is a final order in modern multi-party,
the facts. See In re Japanese Electronic Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d at 1084-86.
In Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litig., the Third Circuit discussed and
contrasted the relative roles of these two powers. See 631 F.2d at 1087-88. The court
reasoned that although the two procedural mechanisms are both controlling devices, in
complex cases the power to direct a verdict is simply not enough to satisfy the dictates
of due process. Only denying a jury trial could ensure that the judgment rendered is
based upon the evidence and relevant legal rules set forth in the trial. See id.
,, 588 S.W.2d 468, 469 (Ky. 1979).
214 Id.
2' Manly v. Manly, 669 S.W.2d 537, 540 (Ky. 1984) (Leibson, J., dissenting).
2 669 S.W.2d 537; Oldfield v. Oldfield, 663 S.W.2d 211 (Ky. 1984); Kupper v.
Kentucky Bd. of Pharmacy, 666 S.W.2d 729 (Ky. 1983); Braden v. Republic-Vanguard
Life Ins. Co., 657 S.W.2d 241 (Ky. 1983); Hagg v. Kentucky Util. Co., 660 S.W.2d 680
(Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
"I Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't v. Hayse, 684 S.W.2d 301 (Ky. Ct. App.
1984). See also text accompanying notes 112-32 supra for a discussion of Hayse as a
class action.
211 See CR 73.02; 669 S.W.2d at 539 (failure to comply with time limit established
by Rule 73.02 for filing of appeal is "fatal.").
11" See 558 S.W.2d at 469-70 (notice of appeal must designate a final judgment
from which the appeal is taken); CR 73.03.
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multi-claim litigation, Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02220 was
amended to provide that orders in such cases are not final and
appealable unless the trial court expressly orders entry of judg-
ment.22' The ritual of that language seems to serve a salutary
function both to litigants-as an alert that appeal time has begun
to run-and to appellate courts-as an indication that the trial
court is finished with the matter.
Despite what appears to be clear protection under Rule 54.02,
the court of appeals has now ruled in Hagg v. Kentucky Util.
Co. 222 that failure to appeal an "interlocutory judgment" that
lacks the rule's required language is fatal.2 23 The "interlocutory
judgment" was a finding by the trial court that the condemning
authority had the right to condemn an easement across the
parties' property. 224 The Kentucky Supreme Court had previously
ruled that such judgments, although denominated by the eminent
domain statute as "interlocutory," were in fact appealable im-
mediately after their entry. 225 In Hagg, the judgment in question
was entered on August 3, 1983 .226 No motions were made during
the ten day period following entry of the judgment and no appeal
was filed within thirty days after the judgment. On September
7, 1983, the landowners moved for time to file "exceptions" to
220 Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02(l) provides:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as
a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may grant a final judgment upon one or
more but less than all of the claims only upon a determination that there
is no just reason for delay. The judgment shall recite such determination
and shall recite that the judgment is final. In the absence of such recital,
any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates
less than all of the claims shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims, and the order or other form of decision is interlocutory and subject
to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the
claims.
' Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides, "the Court may direct the entry
of a final judgment ... only upon an express determination that there is no just reason
for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment."
660 S.W.2d 680 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
2I Id. at 680.
21 See id. at 681. The finding was made pursuant to KRS § 416.610 (1972), which
provides that the court's order entered upon the condemning authority's report is
interlocutory.
225 Ratliff v. Fiscal Court of Caldwell County, 617 S.W.2d 36, 39 (Ky. 1981).
226 See 660 S.W.2d at 681.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
the August 3 judgment, and the motion was granted by the trial
court. 227 The court of appeals ruled that the "exceptions" were
in fact an attempt to vacate the previously entered judgment228
and that such an attempt was untimely under Rule 59.05 since
it was brought more than ten days after entry of the judgment.
229
The trial court's allowing the filing of "exceptions" was mean-
ingless since that court was powerless to extend the time for
filing a motion to vacate the judgment. 20 The case illustrates
that the "certification" provisions of Kentucky Rule 54.02 can-
not always be relied upon by the practitioner. The inclusion of
the required language did not prevent the class certification from
being held nonappealable in Hayse231 and the lack of the lan-
guage in Hagg did not prevent the judgment from being ap-
pealable. 23 2 Perhaps the most practical lesson to be learned is
this: when in doubt, appeal, thus avoiding killing an appeal
through untimeliness.
Once the decision to appeal has been made, the most im-
mediately pressing step is filing the notice of appeal and payment
of the filing fee. Manly v. Manly233 indicates the dangers involved
in even these simple steps. In Manly, the notice of appeal was
filed on the last day permitted. 234 The appeal was stamped on
the filing date but the filing fee was not paid until two days
later. Thus, the notice was timely filed but the filing fee was
not paid until after expiration of the time for taking an appeal.
The issue before the Kentucky Supreme Court was: when was
See id.
See id. at 682.
- "A motion to alter or amend a judgment, or to vacate a judgment and enter a
new one, shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the final judgment." CR
59.05.
210
When by statute or by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by
order of court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a
specified time, the court for cause shown may, at any time in its discretion
... order the [time] period enlarged ... but it may not extend the time
for taking any action under Rule ... 59.05 ... except to the extent and
under the conditions stated in them.
CR 6.02.
"1 684 S.W.2d at 303.
-"- 660 S.W.2d at 680.
669 S.W.2d 537 (Ky. 1984).
- See id. at 540 (citing CR 73.02(1)(a)).
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the appeal filed-when the notice was stamped or when the fee
was paid?
235
Adhering to the doctrine of strict compliance, the Court
stated:
It is the holding of this court that the payment of a filing fee
for appeals is no longer simply a procedural step in perfecting
an appeal. The payment of the filing fee is a condition prec-
edent to the filing of a Notice of Appeal, and until the filing
fee has been paid, the Notice of Appeal cannot be filed.26
Since the fee was paid two days after the time for appeal expired,
the appeal was not timely filed and thus was dismissed as time
barred .2
7
An obvious solution to the dangers of Manly is to habitually
attach a check for the filing fee to the notice of appeal. Another
solution, and one that would probably serve the practitioner well
in areas other than appeals, is simply not to file documents on
the very last day permitted by law. Rather than running the risk
of accident or a miscount, the prudent course seems to be to
plan ahead.
After filing a notice of appeal and paying a filing fee, the
next procedural step requiring careful attention is filing a des-
ignation of the record. 25 In Oldfield v. Oldfield,239 the Kentucky
Supreme Court encountered still another appellate case that was
wrecked by this seemingly innocent requirement of properly
designating the record for appeal.2 40
In 1980, the Kentucky Court of Appeals clearly warned that
documents designating "the entire record" were no longer ac-
23s See id.
236 Id.
13, See id.
238
Unless an agreed statement of the case is certified as provided in Rule
75.15, within 10 days after filing a notice of appeal the appellant shall
serve upon the appellee and file in the trial court (a) a designation of such
untranscribed portions of the proceedings stenographically or mechanically
recorded as he wishes to be included in the record on appeal. ...
CR 75.01(1).
663 S.W.2d 211 (Ky. 1984).
See id. at 212.
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ceptable.241 In Oldfield, a transcript of the evidence and pro-
ceedings was prepared by the court reporter and forwarded to
the court of appeals with the designation: "The entire record of
the herein-above styled action to be included in the record on
appeal to the Kentucky Court of Appeals. ' 242 Adhering to a
previous ruling,243 the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the
fact of receiving the required transcript was not dispositive;
absent a proper designation, even an actually received transcript
could not be considered in ruling on the appeal. 244 Since the case
could not be ruled upon without a transcript of the evidence,
the appeal was necessarily dismissed.
24
-
Much of the current confusion probably stems from conflict-
ing usages of the word "record." The current version of Ken-
tucky Rule of Civil Procedure 75.01 does not require certification
to transmit to the court of appeals the "record" as it exists in
the circuit court clerk's office. 246 In the parlance of the rules,
the "record" is the file that physically exists in the clerk's office.
A designation is necessary only if one wishes the appeals court
to consider items not included in that "record.' '247 To the prac-
ticing lawyer, however, "the record" is usually synonymous with
"the transcript." Thus, a rule saying that no designation is
necessary if one wishes to rely only on "the record" is mislead-
ing. The Oldfield Court attempted to clarify the issue by pointing
out that "[t]he transcript of evidence stenographically reported,
the voir dire, and statements of counsel are not a part of the
clerk's original record and do not constitute a part of the record
on appeal unless they are specifically designated pursuant to
C.R. 75.01." ' 243
211 See Seale v. Riley, 602 S.W.2d 441, 443 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (The court held
that "a designation of the entire trial court record is not adequate under the current
CR 75.01.").
... 663 S.W.2d at 211. The Court cited Seale v. Riley, stating that "[n]otice was
given that on and after August 1, 1980, a designation which designates only 'the entire
trial court record' shall be held improper and will be grounds for dismissal of the
appeal." Id.
"I Commonwealth v. Black, 329 S.W.2d 192, 193 (Ky. 1959).
2" See 663 S.W.2d at 213.
-" See id.
' See id. at 212.
." See id.
,. Id.
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The designation rule prevents the costly preparation of un-
necessary transcripts and alleviates overburdening appellate courts
with irrelevant papers. Yet a bias against as much paperwork as
possible should not be taken to mean that papers can uniformly
be done away with. A fine balance must be struck between a
sufficient "record" and one without unduly inclusive designa-
tions. Again, however, as in the case of timely filing, any error
must be in favor of including too much rather than too little.
Present penalties for over-inclusion cannot possibly offset the
dangers of under-inclusion.
While the cases discussed so far might lead a practitioner to
believe that almost any small procedural misstep is fatal, there
are two recent cases that show a bit more leniency. In Braden
v. Republic- Vanguard Life Insurance CO.,249 the Kentucky Su-
preme Court indicated that all parties from the trial court level
need not be included as parties in the appeal. 20 Braden involved
a widow's suit against an insurer on a mortgage life insurance
policy. 25' The trial court ordered the mortgagee joined as an
indispensable party under Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 19.
The widow lost on summary judgment, which was certified by
the trial court as a final appealable order under. Rule 54.02. 2
In her appeal, the widow did not join the mortgagee as a party.25
3
The Court recognized that, in an appeal, failure to join an
indispensable party is fatal,2 4 but felt that the presence of the
mortgagee was not necessary.25 The Court reasoned that if the
judgment were reversed and the widow received the money, the
mortgagee could still be paid from the proceeds of the judg-
ment.2 16 The mortgagee also continued to be protected by its lien
on the property until payment was made on the underlying note.
Nevertheless, had counsel misjudged the necessity of the mort-
gagee's presence, a potentially meritorious appeal might- have
241 657 S.W.2d 241 (Ky. 1983).
1o See id. at 244.
See id. at 242.
22 See id. at 242-43.
213 See id. at 243.
254 See Levin v. Ferrer, 535 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Ky. 1975).
21 See 657 S.W.2d at 243.
256 See id.
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been lost. A more prudent approach would have been simply to
join the mortgagee.
Incongruously, in Kupper v. Kentucky Board of Pharmacy ,257
the Kentucky Supreme Court allowed a state licensing board to
escape any consequence for committing a cardinal sin in appel-
late practice-failure to file an appeal brief in a timely fashion.
Kupper's license to practice pharmacy had been taken away
because he had sold controlled substances with such frequency
to certain persons as to indicate their habitual use of the drugs.2 18
Despite the Kentucky Board of Pharmacy's failure to file a
timely brief in the court of appeals, the Supreme Court approved
the court of appeals' refusal to penalize the Board259 and af-
firmed the Board's decision to suspend the license.
260
Whatever might be the case in an ordinary civil suit, it seems
inappropriate for the Board of Pharmacy to lose its case due to
a failure to file a timely brief. While that sanction might be
appropriately imposed on an individual party, its application to
the Board would have had a detrimental effect on the public
generally. Thus, Kupper seems limited by its particular facts and
the average practitioner would be well-advised not to even con-
template the late filing of an appeal brief.
VI. REs JUDICATA
Three cases during the past two years have touched upon
various aspects of res judicata. 261 Before turning to a discussion
of the cases, one should remember that res judicata has abso-
" 666 S.W.2d 729 (Ky. 1984).
See id. at 729-30.
2 Rule 76.12(8) enumerates the penalties for failure to comply with the require-
ments for briefs, established by other parts of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 76.12(8)(c) provides in pertinent part:
If the appellee's brief has not been filed within the time allowed, the court
may: (i) accept the appellant's statement of the facts and issues as correct;
(ii) reverse the judgment if appellant's brief reasonably appears to sustain
such action; or (iii) regard the appellee's failure as a confession of error
and reverse the judgment without considering the merits of the case.
:' See 666 S.W.2d at 730.
Waddell v. Stevenson, 683 S.W.2d 955 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984); Riherd v. Kirchner,
No. 83-CA-409-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 1984); McMillion v. Garrett, No. 83-CA-
499-MR and No. 83-CA-722-MR (Ky. Ct. App. May 25, 1984).
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lutely nothing to do with truth, justice, or the correctness of
results; the concept simply involves finality. "Courts can only
do their best to determine the truth on the basis of the evidence,
and the first lesson one must learn on the subject of res judicata
is that judicial findings must not be confused with absolute
truth. ' 262 If there is a touchstone here, it is that everyone is
entitled to only one day in court on related matters; after that,
the matter is laid to rest either by the plaintiff's loss (in which
case he is barred thereafter) or by his victory (in which case his
rights are merged thereafter). The difficulty, of course, is to
identify "related matters."
The Kentucky Court of Appeals decision in Waddell v.
Stevenson263 illustrates some of the simpler aspects of res judi-
cata. As is typical of cases involving more than one suit, how-
ever, the facts are somewhat confusing.
Waddell sued Bushart in federal court on a claim for breach
of contract in the building of a house. 264 Although there were
numerous unpaid materialmen, none were joined in the action.
Bushart counterclaimed against Waddell for money allegedly
due, noting the existence of unpaid materialmen who had as-
serted liens against the property but taking no steps to join such
persons. After a jury trial, Waddell prevailed on his claim and
Bushart failed on his counterclaim. The federal court judgment
was rendered upon that basis.
265
While the action was pending in federal court, but prior to
the entry of judgment, various materialmen filed actions against
Waddell to enforce their liens for unpaid construction debts. In
one action, Waddell impleaded Bushart for indemnification; in
the other, Bushart was a codefendant and Waddell cross-claimed
for indemnification. The actions were consolidated by the state
trial court. Ultimately the materialmen recovered against Wad-
dell and Waddell's claim against Bushart was dismissed. Waddell
argued that the materialmen were barred from recovering against
him by the res judicata effect of the federal suit; Bushart argued
212 Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9
STAN. L. REV. 281, 315 (1956-57).
, 683 S.W.2d 955 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
'- Id. at 956-57.
261 Id. at 957.
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that the rights of Waddell were merged in the federal suit thus
preventing indemnification by res judicata.
266
Waddell's claim that the materialmen were barred by res
judicata was properly rejected by the trial court and affirmed
by the court of appeals. 267 Due process mandates that a judgment
can bind only parties or those in privity with parties. 268 Clearly
the materialmen were not parties to the federal action, but
whether they were "in privity" with Bushart was more difficult
to discern. The real issue was whether their interest was suffi-
ciently consistent with Bushart's so that it would be fair to bind
them by a judgment against him. 269 Although Bushart sought,
as a portion of his counterclaim, to recover the money due the
materialmen, a finding against him could not fairly be applied
to the materialmen. A finding that he charged in excess of the
contract prices would not imply that the materialmen had not
performed under their contracts. The court further found that
the fact that two of the materialmen testified in the federal trial
did not establish such a connection as to bind them by the
judgment. 20 Such testimony could only bind a non-party if,
although not formally designated as a party, the witness actually
controlled and conducted the litigation. 27'
On the other hand, it was quite clear that the federal court
action concerned the rights of Waddell and Bushart arising from
the construction of the house. 272 The damages arising to Waddell
from Bushart's breach were adjudicated in federal court. If
Waddell recovered in federal court for the claims he knew existed
in favor of materialmen, then it would be unfair to allow him
to recover a second time in state court. If, on the other hand,
Waddell had not recovered for his contingent liabilities to the
materialmen, then he simply had omitted an element from his
= Id.
" d. at 957-58.
Id. at 958 (quoting 46 Am. JUR. 2D Judgments § 518 (1969)).
: 683 S.W.2d at 958.
2o Id. at 958-59.
2I See McKenzie v. Hinkle, 112 S.W.2d 1019, 1021 (Ky. 1938) ("The courts look
beyond the nominal parties, and treat all those whose interests are involved in the
litigation and who conduct and control the action or defense as real parties and hold
them concluded by any judgments. . .
"I See 683 S.W.2d at 958.
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cause of action. Whether or not he included all of his damages,
the federal court case was his "day in court" on his problem
with Bushart.
It is that concept-splitting of a cause of action-that has
caused two recent decisions on res judicata. Both cases originated
in the district court's small-claims division.273 In examining the
cases, it is important to remember that the small-claims division
is a very limited division of what is itself a court of limited and
inferior jurisdiction-the district court. 2
74
Riherd v. Kirchner275 arose out of an automobile accident.
The plaintiff sued in small-claims court attempting to recover
for car rental expenses incurred while his vehicle was being
repaired.27 6 The defendant prevailed by directed verdict, it having
been admitted by the plaintiff that he did not use his vehicle for
business purposes. 277 Following that loss, the plaintiff sued
defendant in circuit court for his personal injuries sustained in
the accident. 27 The defendant contended that the plaintiff had
split his cause of action and that his loss in district court served
to bar a later suit for personal injuries; the circuit court agreed
and entered summary judgment against the plaintiff.
279
While stating that the issue was one of first impression in
Kentucky, the court of appeals held that the cause of action had
not been split and thus the plaintiff was not barred in his
subsequent action. 20 The court explained that parties would be
held to be barred or merged only as to issues actually litigated
in a court of inferior jurisdiction. Thus the plaintiff was not
barred because the "district court issued a narrow ruling, holding
that the [plaintiff] was not entitled to full reimbursement in that
he did not use the rental car for business purposes." ' 2 ' The
273 McMillion v. Garrett, No. 83-CA-499-MR and No. 83-CA-722-MR (Ky. Ct.
App. May 25, 1984); Riherd v. Kirchner, No. 83-CA-409-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 27,
1984).
27 At the time these actions were brought, small claims were limited to an amount
not in excess of $1,000.00. KRS § 24A.230.
27I No. 83-CA-409-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 1984). EDrroR's NOTE: Riherd v. Kirchner
was reversed as this issue was going to press. See 702 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. 1985).
176 See id., slip op. at 2.
27 Id., slip op. at 8.
211 Id., slip op. at 2.
279 Id., slip op. at 3.
Id., slip op. at 7.
21 Id., slip op. at 8.
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plaintiff was thus successful in dodging the prior adjudication's
preclusive effect.
In McMillion v. Garrett,282 a decision rendered by the court
of appeals subsequent to Riherd, the plaintiff fell prey to res
judicata's preclusive effect. In McMillion, the plaintiff sued
successfully in small-claims court to recover property damage
arising from an auto accident. The property aspect was settled
by an agreed judgment accompanied by a dismissal with preju-
dice. When the plaintiff then sued in circuit court seeking re-
covery for personal injuries sustained in the same accident, the
court held that her rights merged in her prior victory in small-
claims court and thus she was precluded from pursuing her claim
for personal injuries.8 3 In upholding the trial court's ruling, the
court of appeals stated the general rule of res judicata: res
judicata bars or merges not only the rights previously litigated,
but also those rights that "properly belonged to the subject of
the litigation in the first action and which in the exercise of
reasonable diligence might have been brought forward at the
time."12
4
In the circuit court action, the plaintiff tried to escape res
judicata consequences by an argument unique to the no-fault
auto insurance setting in which she found herself. She argued
that at the time of her small-claims action, her personal injury
medical expenses had not crossed the threshold requirement of
one thousand dollars, and thus she had no personal injury claim
for damages at that time.2 85 In other words, her personal injury
claim had not arisen at the time of the small-claims action and
thus could not be merged into her victory there.286 The court of
appeals rejected that argument, saying that the claim for per-
sonal injuries arose at the time of the physical injury, not at the
time the threshold was crossed.2 87 Thus the plaintiff had split
No. 83-CA-499-MR and No. 83-CA-722-MR (Ky. Ct. App. May 25, 1984).
Id., slip op. at 6, 7.
Id., slip op. at 7.
2 KRS § 304.39-060(2)(b) (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1984) provides that a plaintiff
may recover from a defendant under the no-fault act only to the extent that the plaintiff's
medical bills exceed $1,000.00.
No. 83-CA-499-MR and No. 83-CA-722-MR, slip op. at 8.
" Id., slip op. at 9.
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her cause of action and her rights were merged into her prior
property damage victory in small-claims court.
The conflict between Riherd and McMillion was settled by
the Supreme Court in a 4-3 decision reversing Riherd.8 1 Unim-
pressed by arguments based upon the district court's limited
jurisdiction, the Kentucky Supreme Court stated: "The fact that
the trial court did not reach the question of liability for negli-
gence does not change the fact that there was a judgment on
the merits based on a claim that grew out of the automobile
accident."
289
Riherd and McMillion should serve as a warning to the
practitioner. Both plaintiffs had their personal injury claims
merged into minor property claims. As Judge Howerton ob-
served, "I would suggest a conservative and cautious approach
by the practitioner." 29° Quite simply, the only prudent approach
is not to split up factually related claims. As the Court main-
tained in Riherd: "[F]airness to the defendant and sound judicial
administration require that at some point litigation over a par-
ticular controversy be brought to a final conclusion.' '291 As far
as the Kentucky courts are concerned, that point is sooner rather
than later.
Kirchner v. Riherd, No. 84-SC-127-DG (Ky. Nov. 21, 1985).
Id., slip op. at 5.
__ No. 83-CA-499-MR and No. 83-CA-722-MR, slip op. at 11 (Howerton, J.,
concurring).
191 No. 84-SC-127-DG, slip op. at 5-6.
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